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The Fulani Jihad (1804-1810) led by Shehu, Uthman Dan Fodio was 
successfully prosecuted against the established Hausa dynasty in Northern 
Nigeria. It led to the emergence of a theocratic state, the Sokoto Caliphate, 
which was administered largely as a federation, due to its wide expanse and 
diverse composition of its people. The causes, management and impact of the 
Jihad as well as important lessons for national integration and development 
in contemporary Nigerian political life form the basic themes of this paper. 
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Introduction 
The Fulani Jihad (1804-1810), had its heart and beginning in Gobir. It should 
be noted that the very essence of the Jihad against established Hausa dynasty 
was in itself a revolution in relationship between the Hausa and the Fulanis. 
It is informative to note that Islam was introduced into Hausa land about the 
14th century by foreign Mallams and merchants, such as Wagara Arabs and 
the Fulanis (Adeleye 1971:560; Afe 2003:23; Hill,2009:8). The latter group 
(Fulani’s) was said to have migrated over the centuries from Futa-Toro area 
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of Senegal and had settled in towns and villages of northwestern 
Hausaland(Robinson, 2004). This had produced a high degree of cultural mix 
among the indigenes and the “alien” group, (Hunwick 1966:293), for the 
Hausas were largely pagan, while the Fulanis were predominantly Muslims. 
Adeleye has observed that through the ensuing admixture between the 
Islamic culture and the indigenous Hausa ‘pagan’ culture, a gradual 
polarization of society along the lines of two conflicting religio-political 
ideologies began (Adeleye, 1971:560). 
It is interesting to note that the whole episode of the Fulani Jihad revolves 
around the life and teachings of Shehu, UthmandanFodio who was believed 
to have been born in 1754 (Fage 1988:200; Crowder &Abdullahi 1979:83) in 
Marata, Gobir, to the Toronkawa tribe of Fulani descent (Milsome 1979:1). 
His descent has been traced to one Mura Jakolo or Jakalo, who had migrated 
to Gobir from Futa-Toro at around the 15th century. UthmandanFodio’s 
ancestors were also believed to have settled originally in Konni before they 
eventually migrated to Degel. 
The Toronkawa, described by Hunwick (1996:293) as a “missionary tribe”, 
had an ancient tradition of Islamic learning and piety. It is not surprising 
therefore that UthmandanFodio himself was an erudite scholar who had 
undertaken a deep study of Islamic law, theology and mysticism, first under 
the tutelage of his father and uncles (Ibid) and later at Agades, north of 
Marata, at the feet of Jebril (Milsome 1979:4). He started preaching at the 
tender age of twenty in the area around Degel at about 1774-1775 (Hunwick 
1966:295; Isichei 1983:202). UthmandanFodio was also reported to have 
embarked on preaching tours or missionary journeys to Kebbi, Zamfara and 
Gobir where he explained the tenets of Islam. Coupled with the use of poems 
and pamphlets written in Arabic, Fulfude and Hausa languages, he was able 
to spread his teachings to most parts of Northern Nigeria. As a reward, he 
won a great number of admirers and followers across the whole of Hausa 
land. This was to play a decisive role in the success of the Jihad some years 
later. 
Causes of the Jihad 
The basic causes of the Fulani Jihad of 1840-1810 have continued to generate 
controversies among scholars (Adeleye 1971(b); Isichei op cit.; Onwubiko 
1982). While some have advanced religious reasons for the outbreak of the 
‘holy war’, others have identified political, socio-economic causes, as well as 
the influence of Islamic reforms elsewhere in West Africa.  
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Perhaps the most important factor that led to the Jihad was the need to purify 
Islam among the Habe states of Northern Nigeria.Hunwick (1966:294), 
Adeleye (1971a:598-99) Crowder (1978:72-6), and Milsome (1979:12), seem 
to agree that the Jihad was a holy war declared and prosecuted with a view to 
establishing a purer form of Islam in a predominantly decadent pagan 
society. It was argued that the Shehu (danFodio) was absolutely sincere to his 
ideals of reviving Islam in Hausa land along the orthodox line. The Fulanis 
accused the Hausa rulers of polytheism. Un-Islamic practices in which the 
Hausa rulers were indulged included: banning of women from wearing veil, 
veneration of rocks and trees, consultation with magicians and soothsayers 
and offering of sacrifices to such deities as Uwandowa (goddess of hunting) 
and Uwargona (goddess of agriculture). The Habe states of the late 18th 
century could therefore be said to belong to a world in which Islam was 
marginally and ceremonially conditioning traditional cultures. As Adeleye 
(1971a:599) has rightly affirmed, it was circumstances such as these to which 
Muslims were radically opposed that brought about the tension which 
precipitated the Jihad. The religious undertone of the Jihad is well articulated 
in the words of Milsome: (1979:12): 
It troubled him (Fodio) greatly that only lip service 
was paid to the Muslim faith in Gobir. Everywhere 
he went with Abdullahi, they saw how lax people 
were towards their religion. The SarkinGobir was 
deliberately discouraging people from observing their 
religion carefully. So angry was UsmandanFodio at 
what he saw that he made up his mind to organize an 
uprising against Yunfa. 
Given the fact that the Muslim law provides a legal justification for holy war 
(revolt) against a state if the ruler places obstacles in the way of the practice 
of the Muslim faith or mixes Muslim and pagan practices (Crowder 1978:71) 
the declaration of a Jihad in February 1804 by UthmandanFodio against the 
Sultan of Gobir could therefore be justified as a religious war, a clash of 
religious outlook between Muslims and pagans.  
The political factor in the outbreak of the Jihad has also been emphasized.  
Adeleye (1971a:578) argues that politically, the Fulanis had remained aliens 
in Hausa land and Borno despite the fact that they had lived there for 
centuries. Without any regard to the substantial number of learned men 
among the Fulanis, they suffered the disabilities of second-rate citizens 
The Fulani Jihad & its Implication for national Integration & Dev. in Nigeria 
Copyright © IAARR 2011: www.afrrevjo.com  4 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
among the Hausas (Ibid). Though some Fulanis were observed to have served 
in the governments of many states in very high places, but this was not in 
their right as representative of Fulani groups, but rather on individual merits. 
In a similar vein, J.D Fage has also argued that, appointments 
notwithstanding, the Fulanis had no voice in the selection of rulers (Fage 
1979:93). The most important consequence of Fulani isolation, as noted by 
Adeleye was a common bond of ‘Pan-Fulanism’. It is argued that the 
isolation of the Fulani as a group created cohesion among them, with 
scattered groups in different localities in Hausa land and Borno, nursing deep 
feelings of resentment against existing governments.  Resentment at their 
total lack of political power had induced the view that the Jihad was more of 
a desire for the expression of Fulani nationalism than a religious 
confrontation. The distribution of power after the Jihad lends credence to this 
political undertone of the Jihad as the Caliphate was largely ruled by the 
Fulani’s (Crowder 1978:76, Afe 2003:25). 
A related political factor that prompted the Jihad was the tension between 
Hausa rulers and Muslim clerics.  Earlier in this paper, it has been stated that 
UthmandanFodio, through his teachings, had gained a good number of 
followership and admirers. Unfortunately, this was to attract the wrath of the 
rulers of Gobir (Hunwick, 295’ Isichie 203-04). Beginning from Bawa in 
1789/1790, Nafata (1794-1801) to Yunfa in 1801, the kings of Gobir 
attempted, through series of legislation, to restrict the Shehu’s power and 
authority to preach and to curb the activities of his Jama’a. This was to 
culminate in the threat to the life of UthmandanFodio by Yunfa. With 
Yunfa’s attack on Abd al-Salam, a staunch disciple of UthmandanFodio who 
resided at Gimbassa, in 1801 (Crowder, 1978:73) the stage seemed set for an 
open confrontation between the Jihadists and the king of Gobir.  Perhaps this 
explains the militant posture of Uthman Dan Fodio and his recourse to a legal 
justification of the war under Islamic law. According to Michael Crowder 
(1978), the holy war becomes sanctioned under the following conditions: if 
the enemy launches a sudden attack on a Muslim territory and if it was to 
rescue captured Muslims from the hands of the heathen (Ibid). The fact that 
these two conditions were met as highlighted in the foregoing analysis, 
especially with the threat to destroy Degel and exterminate the Muslims by 
Yunfa coupled with the earlier attack on Abd al-Salam, was to inform the 
flight to Hijra by UthmandanFodio and his followers from the land of the 
pagans, Degel, to Gudu in February 1804 as a prelude to the declaration of 
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the war. This may perhaps be argued to be the immediate cause of the 1804 
Jihad. 
Furthermore, the declaration of the Jihad of 1804 has also been explained in 
terms of socio-economic problems that were prevalent in Hausa land prior to 
the Jihad. It has been suggested that the Jihad was a revolt against the illegal 
and excessive taxation imposed on the masses by the governments of the 
Habe states which was widely criticized by UsmandanFodio (Ibid; Milsome 
p.8; Afe, 26). Some of the erratic taxes were the cattle tax (Jingali), market 
tax, rent for the use of grazing lands imposed on the Fulanis and the 
collection of increased tributes from farmers. These illegal extortions, 
especially the cattle tax, were vehemently opposed and criticized by the 
Fulani pastoralists. It may therefore be argued that the heavy taxation levied 
on the peasantry alienated the peasants from the ruling class and may partly 
explain the rationale for the UthmandanFodio led Jihad. 
Apart from this, allegations of corruption were rife against the governments 
of the Habe states. State officials perpetrated corruption in the giving and 
taking of bribe. The perversion of justice was also noted to have become the 
order of the day among judges. Isichie (1983:2003) caught a glimpse of the 
state of corruption in the pre-Jihad Habe states when she quoted 
UsmandanFodio as saying:  
If you have an adversary in law and he precedes you 
to them (judges) and give them some money, then 
your word will not be accepted by them, even though 
they know for a certainty of your truthfulness, unless 
you give them more (money) than your adversary 
gave. 
Given this untold hardship and cruelty meted on the people and the 
ostentatious way in which most of the chieftains of Gobir lived, the Jihad 
almost became a class struggle between the Hausa-Fulani commoners and 
their Habe rulers. (Age, 7). 
Onwubiko and Crowder opine that the UthmandanFodio Jihad was caused in 
part by the inspiration and influence of reform movements in the Islamic 
world during the period. It was argued that the successes recorded by 
jihadists at Futa Djallon (1725), FutaBondu and Futa Toro (1768) served as 
impetus for Fodio in his own jihad against the rulers of Hausa land 
(Onwubikoop.cit 403). The earlier jihads mentioned here were meant to 
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establish  states governed according to Islamic law and aimed at returning the 
pure and primitive faith of Islam, purged off heresies and accretions in which 
Shariah law would be the guiding rule of the state. The UthmandanFodio 
Jihad shared the same goals.  It may therefore be true to a very large extent 
that UthmandanFodio was further motivated by the success of jihadists in 
other parts of West Africa. This however should not erode the fact the holy 
war of UthmandanFodio had enough political, religious and socio-economic 
justifications. 
The UthmandanFodio jihad eventually started in 1804 and lasted till around 
1810. Perhaps the most remarkable thing to note about the Jihad was its 
success in Gobir and most parts of Northern Nigeria. By 1810, the Jihad had 
succeeded in the old Habe states of Katsina, Daura, Kano and Zaria. 
Although it failed in Borno, three emirates: Gombe, Hadejia and Katagum, 
were nevertheless established. The establishment of new emirates continued 
till 1859 (Isicheiop.cit 207). 
Reasons for Success of the Jihad 
Historians and political observers have attempted to explain the reasons or 
factors for the success of the jihad against embellished Hausa dynasties. One 
of such factors as identified by Adeleye (1971:600) was the charisma of 
Shehu, UthmandanFodio. It was noted that UthmandanFodio, being a learned 
theologian and a pious Sufi, heir to a tradition of learning and social 
respectability in his family, had all the makings of a charismatic leader. His 
towering personality would rightly explain the success with which he co-
coordinated the scattered jama’as across Hausa land. His leadership qualities 
enhanced the success of the jihad.  
Equally important for the success of the jihad was the ideological factor. The 
basic doctrine which the Shehu explained and elaborated upon in his 
numerous pamphlets and books is as follows:  
A Muslim should not willingly dwell in a land of 
unbelief, but if he has the means at his disposal, 
should migrate from it to the abode of Islam, should 
wage the jihad against those in the Abode of war (the 
unbelievers). This is the more urgent if the 
unbelievers are making pretence of Islam which may 
lead others astray or are claiming their actions to be 
in the name of Islam while in fact they contradict the 
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law of Islam. Furthermore, Muslims should come to 
the aid of other Muslims who are being attacked or 
oppressed by unbelievers (Hunwick 1966:296). 
Judging from the above, it may be observed that the jihadists needed only a 
little awakening to take up arms in the eventual outbreak of war as they were 
already indoctrinated for such an action.  
Another remarkable force that enhanced the success of the jihad was the large 
followership enjoyed by UthmandanFodio. By the turn of the 19th century, 
the Shehu’s power had grown considerably that he had groups of supporters 
scattered throughout Gobir, Zamfara and Kebbi who were willing to come to 
his support in time of trouble. It was this widespread allegiance to him and 
his ideals which was to be crucial when the final clash with authority came in 
1804. 
The superior morale and determination of the Shehu’s forces that fought for 
their survival as a group and for their faith was another decisive factor for 
success. The Islamic scholars and disciples fought fiercely, not minding 
death, which they even saw as a ladder to martyrdom (Isichei 1983:201). 
Furthermore, the military prowess of Abdullahi and Mohamed Bello cannot 
be over-emphasized in the success story of the Jihad. Both of them were 
good soldiers who also trained their followers to fight for their faith. The 
pastoral Fulani’s (Boroje) were reported to have been a widely spread 
reservoirs of manpower for the military service of the Jihad. Having being 
accustomed to a hard nomadic life with a long experience of fighting either in 
self defence or in the service of others, and given their skilled use of bow and 
arrow, the Fulani pastoralists proved to be a useful addition to Usman’s army 
(Fage op. Cit, Milsomeop.cit 12, 24). 
The flags given to his chieftains by UsmandanFodio as symbols of authority 
also served to unite the jihadists in spirit. The flag signified the protection of 
the Shehu and his authority. It went to a very large extent to develop in the 
flag-bearers and their adherents a sense of espirit de corps, which provided 
the much-needed cohesion for the Jihad forces across the whole of Hausa 
land (Milsome, 24). 
Lack of unity among the Hausa states greatly enabled the jihadists to run over 
the states on a piece-meal basis without much resistance. The internecine 
conflicts between the Hausa states ruled out a combination of forces against 
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an external power. It need be stated that the attempt to realize boundaries 
most conducive to political and economic survival as well as prosperity and 
power was the perennial source of conflict and wars among the Hausa states 
between the 15th and 18th centuries. As a result of inter-state wars, the forces 
of each state appear already spent before the attack of the jihadists, making 
them easy prey before the conquering religious militants (Adeleye I (a), 593-
94; Isichei, 2002). 
Given the enabling environment in which the Jihadists operated, success 
became a matter of forgone conclusion as observed in the spread of the 
Sokoto Caliphate after the cessation of hostilities in 1810.   
Effects of the Jihad on Inter-Group Relations in Nigeria 
The UthmandanFodio Jihad marks a milestone in the history of Nigeria. The 
impact of the Jihad which officially came to an end between 1809 and 1810 
is still being felt in the nation’s socio-political life. It is said to be at the root 
of the infamous north-south dichotomy impeding the cohesion, unity and 
stability of the Nigerian polity. An examination of the momentous effect of 
this all-important event will be the theme of subsequent paragraphs. 
Perhaps the greatest impact of the Jihad was the creation of the vast religio-
political edifice known as the Sokoto Caliphate. According to Ikime, the 
Caliphate embraced most of the Hausa states, parts of the Bornu empire: 
which became the emirates of Gombe, Hadejia and Katagum; Nupe and 
Ilorin. Fage(op.cit200)  estimates that the Islamic  empire covered about 
180,000 square miles and had a population of about ten million people. Not 
minding the accuracy or otherwise of these estimates, going by the 
absorption of all the important Hausa states by the caliphate and its extension 
into other parts of the country, one cannot but agree with Crowder and 
Abdullahi (op.cit 97) that the caliphate was the largest political entity ever 
created in Nigeria. It was headed by the Caliph. The caliphate was divided 
into emirates (Abubakar 1980:203). Each was headed by an Emir who was 
responsible to the Caliph who had its headquarters at Sokoto. It is interesting 
to note that the caliphate was largely a federal state. This was informed by its 
geography as the caliphate contained diverse independent communities and 
states within its borders (Ibid.304). The Caliph provided the much needed 
leadership and direction for the emirate councils through the issuance of 
fatwa on legal issues of different nature in the caliphate. He also arbitrated in 
intra and inter-emirate disputes (Ibid: 307).  
Vol. 5 (5), Serial No. 22, October, 2011. Pp. 1-12 
Copyright © IAARR 2011: www.afrrevjo.com  9 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
The UthmandanFodio Jihad also resulted in the flowering of Islam in 
Hausaland and the consolidation of Muslim culture first in Hausaland and 
then in non-Hausa areas such as Nupe, Ilorin and parts of the Benue valley 
region (Ikime, op cit).Prior to the Jihad, Islam was essentially a royal 
religion. However, the Jihad ensured its flowering among the Hausa 
peasantry who had little or no experience of Islam before (Afeop.cit: 27). 
The Jihad also led to the emergence of a lingua franca over a large area of 
Nigeria. Ikime has asserted that with the triumph of Hausa language over 
Fulfude, Hausa language became the everyday language of the caliphate, 
though Arabic remained the language of Islam. The British recognized this 
lingua franca over a large area of northern Nigeria and made use of it as the 
official language of native administration. This has promoted the unity of the 
north (Ikime, op.cit:14). 
Furthermore, the Uthmandan Jihad could be said to have brought unity to 
Hausaland. It would be recalled that through inter-state wars, Hausa states 
had for centuries tried without success to impose an imperial authority which 
could guarantee political order, stability and unity among the Habe states. 
Fortunately, the Jihad, by enthroning Islam provided the much-needed supra-
state ideology for integration among the Hausa states. The Jihad brought a 
new peace to the north. The intermittent and internecine wars were brought to 
an end (Adeleye (a) op.cit 601; Ikimeop.cit II). 
Another major impact of the Jihad was the Fulani ascendance to governance. 
The old Hausa aristocracy was replaced by a Fulani aristocracy. Prior to the 
Jihad, the Fulanis, despite their long stay in Hausaland, had been foreigners 
in the realm of government in the real sense of it. They were largely treated 
as second-class citizens. However, with the success of the Fulani Jihad, the 
Hausas were dispossessed of political authority. As Hill (2009) observes, 
with the help of a large Fulani cavalry and Hausa peasants, Uthman Dan 
Fodio overthrew the region’s Hausa rulers and replaced them with Fulani 
emirs. The stage was set for this development when the flag-bearers who 
became the first set of emirs were primarily clerics and scholars (Macmillan, 
1968:29). The consequence of this is still found today as the Fulani still 
dominate Nigerian politics. 
The UthmandanFodioJihad also led to the emergence of the Hausa-Fulani 
ethnic group in Nigeria. Yusuf BalaUsman argues that due to long period of 
co-existence between the Hausa and Fulani, the ethnic line between them had 
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become remarkably blurred (Usman 1979:34-58). This new found solidarity 
has been enhanced by a common religion and culture. The two groups have 
since been acting collectively in the political dynamics of Nigeria. This has 
presented a more ‘United’ North as against the seemingly divided south. 
The dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims, noticed considerably in 
the North-Middle Belt relations may be said to have its roots in the Jihad of 
1804. Its negative impact on inter-group relations in Nigeria continues to 
linger on. Ikime has submitted that the middle belt region suffered a great 
deal of depopulation occasioned by incessant slave raids by the emirates of 
Sokoto caliphate. It is informative to mention here that payment of tributes in 
form of slaves was part of the obligations of the emirs to the caliph. The non-
Muslim people of the middle-belt were in essence under constant attack as 
enslavement of fellow Muslims was forbidden. Noticeable depopulation and 
displacement became the lot of these peoples. This is said to be responsible 
for the uneasy peace that reigns between the North and Middle Belt regions 
of Nigeria today (Ward 1966, p.314). 
It is important to stress the impact of the Jihad on Yoruba land. The end 
result of Ilorin imperial activities in the 19th century was the spread of Islam 
to Yoruba land. But much more than that, Ilorin, a one-time province of the 
Old Oyo Empire became part of the Sokoto caliphate. This is creating tension 
in Ilorin today with respect to political classification. Is it part of the South 
Western states or a part of the North? The answer to this question may not be 
easily provided for some time to come. Again, the clamour for the 
establishment of Shariah court in Yoruba land will continue to generate 
controversy as Yoruba land has a long history of religious plurality.    
Conclusion 
In this paper an attempt has been made at examining the UthmandanFodio or 
the Fulani Jihad (1804-1810) with particular reference to its impact on inter-
group relations in Nigeria. The main causes of the Jihad as well as the 
conditions that enhanced its success were also highlighted. The main thrust 
of the foregoing analysis and discussion has been that the Fulani Jihad offers 
some lessons to Nigeria’s political leaders in terms of policy making for 
national integration. Given the huge size of the Sokoto caliphate, the by-
product of the Jihad, its cohesion and unity, stability as well as its seeming 
easy administration, the prospects for a united, strong and stable Nigerian 
polity is an attainable goal.  
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Furthermore, the various sources of tension in the country can be adequately 
managed and possibly eliminated if leaders would be sincere in the pursuit of 
the nation’s ideology. The case of the Jihad putting an end to the intermittent 
wars in Northern Nigeria and the peaceful conduct of relations among diverse 
ethnic groups under the Sokoto caliphate offer good examples to Nigerians. 
Without mincing words, a state ideology is a sine qua non for political 
integration in any nation. It serves as a unifying factor in a heterogeneous 
society like Nigeria. It also forges a sense of commitment to the wellbeing of 
a nation by its diverse peoples.  
The leadership factor is also of paramount importance to national integration 
in Nigeria. A major lesson from the Fulani Jihad therefore is that we need 
sincere, energetic and charismatic leadership like Uthman Dan Fodio for a 
successful co-ordination and integration of Nigerian peoples for growth and 
development. 
Lastly, given the variety of the Nigerian land and peoples, the experiment of 
the Sokoto caliphate suggests that federalism is perhaps the best form of 
government for Nigeria. This will ensure unity in diversify as each of the 
component units will be able to develop at its own pace while the federal or 
central government will be engaged in co-coordinating the general affairs of 
the nation for her survival and greatness. Hence all the component units of 
the Nigerian federation should strive to uphold and strengthen the existing 
federal structure for there-in lies the greatness of the country.    
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